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Abstract
This paper examines the transition effects of population aging in more developed regions
that is also expected to occur in developing regions in the near future.  We address these effects
by exploring the influences of internationally mobile capital and a politically responsive fiscal
policy in a two-country overlapping generations model.  Our results show that the combination
of capital mobility and endogenous fiscal policy play an important role in how economies
respond to population aging.  Capital mobility has consumption smoothing effects but
endogenous fiscal policy is the key factor in creating asymmetries between countries.  The
interaction of the two may even account for a change in the pattern, in addition to a change in the
size, of the effects of population aging on economic growth and welfare when compared to
closed economy and exogenous fiscal policy models.  We find that even when the demographic
shock in the two regions is symmetric, reaction to this shock depends on the timing of the shock.
Overall, the late, developing country demographic shock produces relatively more favorable
economic outcomes worldwide.  Finally, our analysis of the timing of developing country aging
indicates that an early aging scenario is more beneficial for both regions.
The global economy is experiencing major changes as a consequence of a demographic
transition in which the populations of developed nations are aging.  Less well understood is the
fact that developing countries are next in this aging trend. Figure 1 shows the demographic
difference between more developed and developing regions.  The projected changes in the old-
age dependency ratio between 1990 and 2150 indicate that population aging will be more
dramatic in more developed regions until 2050.  Developing regions are expected to experience
serious population aging between 2050 and 2150, during which time the dependency ratio levels
off in more developed regions.  Thus, population aging is not confined to more developed
regions; sooner or later populations of all nations are expected to age.
An important and widely ignored characteristic of the recent aging trend is that it
influences fiscal policy decision making concurrently with rapid global capital market
integration.  In a world connected by an international capital market, population aging in one
region of the world leads to capital flows by altering saving and consumption behavior and, by
extension, changes fiscal policy.  An endogenously changing fiscal policy in turn affects human
capital accumulation by changing government spending for public goods such as education that
serve as inputs to human capital.  Through these channels, population aging is expected to have
strong growth and welfare implications.  In this paper, I examine the transition effects of
population aging that is occurring in more developed regions and that is expected to occur in
developing regions in the near future.  The paper has two goals.  The first goal is to establish the
roles of international capital mobility, a politically responsive fiscal policy, and the interaction of
the two in explaining the transition effects of population aging. Demographic changes in the two
regions at different periods affect the political process of determining fiscal policies and lead to
capital flows by creating interest rate differentials between countries.  Thus, we expect to see
2both domestic and global effects of these demographic changes.  The second goal is to compare
the effects of aging under different aging scenarios for the developing regions.  Since developing
country aging is based on population projections, an analysis on the timing of developing
country aging will tell us how our results might change if actual outcomes differ from
projections.
Our results indicate that international capital mobility and endogenous fiscal policy
together may account for a change in the pattern, in addition to a change in the size, of the effects
of population aging on economic growth and welfare when compared to closed economy and
exogenous fiscal policy models.  We find that even when the demographic shock in the two
regions is symmetric, reaction to this shock depends on the timing of the shock.  Overall, the
late, developing country demographic shock produces relatively more favorable economic
outcomes worldwide.  Finally, our analysis of the timing of developing country aging indicates
that an early aging scenario is more beneficial for both regions.
The paper is structured as follows.  The next section reviews the recent literature on
population aging, followed by a description of a two-country, two-period overlapping
generations model.  The paper then examines dynamic capital stock transitions between pre-
aging and post-aging steady states analytically.  Transition analysis requires simulation; I then
describe the parameters used in the simulation study and present simulation results together with
a sensitivity analysis in the next section followed by my concluding remarks.
Previous Literature
A number of studies examine the macroeconomic effects of population aging.  Recent
theoretical studies generally lack consideration of effects that emerge from international capital
mobility.  However, by allowing for endogenous fiscal policy, some of these studies emphasize
3the importance of the simultaneity of government policies and the demographic structure of
voters.  Holtz-Eakin (1993), Meijdam et al. (1996), and Holtz-Eakin, Lovely and Tosun (2000)
are closely related to this paper in terms of the fiscal policy aspect of the model structure.  Holtz-
Eakin (1993), using a modified version of the standard overlapping generations model, allows
for endogenous fiscal policy.  The author conducts a series of steady state simulations and shows
that demographic change has significant impact on the growth of the economy as well as on
government expenditure and taxation.  Holtz-Eakin, Lovely and Tosun (2000) address in a
closed economy setting how government spending for public education is affected by population
aging.  The study shows that even though demographic shift favors voters with a lower
preference for education spending, reduced taxes may raise capital per worker enough to raise
education spending. Meijdam et al. (1996), uses a similar approach to examine, in a closed
economy framework, the effect of aging on the economy in general and on the evolution of
public pension schemes.  However, this study does not model the political process of fiscal
policy determination explicitly.
Empirical studies generally use three different types of models.  One of these is the Cass-
Ramsey-Solow growth model.  Cutler et al. (1990) and Börsch-Supan (1996) are recent
examples of this type.  They both model capital flows within the OECD region. Cutler et al.
show that capital flows change the size rather than the pattern of the effects of aging on
consumption and they predict higher initial consumption than in autarky for the United States.
Börsch-Supan predicts considerable capital flows to slowly aging Southern European Periphery,
particularly to Turkey, within the OECD area.  Neither of these studies models fiscal policy as
endogenously determined with aging.  Another group of studies employs multi-regional dynamic
macroeconomic models that build on the consumption model of “perpetual youth” by Blanchard
(1985).  Of these, Masson and Tryon (1990) is a macroeconometric model that allows for capital
flows between industrialized nations.  They combine the effect of a higher dependency ratio and
4higher government expenditures due to aging.  However, they obtain the annual series of
government expenditures by interpolating estimates from another study.  Thus, they do not treat
fiscal policy as endogenous.  Turner et al. (1998) employ the OECD “Minilink” model (a
structural dynamic macro model).  They allow for capital flows between a group of
industrialized countries and the rest of the world, which they divide between “fast-aging” and
“slow-aging” countries.  They model government behavior by introducing a fiscal reaction
function in which the tax rate adjusts gradually to close the gap between current government debt
and its exogenous target in the long run.  However, in this model public expenditures on
education are assumed to change, simply in proportion to the change in population aged less than
15 years old.  Although there is a tendency towards allowing for international capital flows,
empirical studies either treat fiscal policy as exogenous or they model it in a rather simplified
fashion.
In the light of this review, we intend to analyze the effects of aging by focusing on the
capital flows between regions.  Unlike the empirical studies mentioned above, we will treat fiscal
policy as endogenously determined through a political process that is triggered by the changing
demographic structure of voters.
The Model
Modeling Strategy
In this section, we describe our modeling strategy by providing details on the three
distinct features of our approach.  First, this paper employs an extended version of the two-
period overlapping generations model with perfect foresight.  By explicitly tracing the life-cycle
of savers, overlapping generations models enable a generational or cohort welfare analysis of
5population aging.  This implies that demographic transitions, which take the form of changing
relative cohort size, can be important determinants of national saving and the current account.
Secondly, we explicitly model a political process for fiscal policy making.  One issue in
recent discussions of aging is the potential generational conflict generated by the need to share
society’s resources between non-working elderly and the younger working population.  For
example, Poterba (1997) provides evidence from the United States that older citizens prefer
lower levels of public spending for education, an expenditure that primarily benefits the young.
Similarly Kahn (2000) shows that population demographics is an important determinant of the
support for environmental regulation.  His results indicate that senior citizens are more likely to
find government spending for environment too high.  To highlight the effect of aging on
economic growth, we maximize this generational conflict by considering only government
expenditure for working young, ignoring social security payments to the old.  In order to
simulate this distributional conflict, a political process must be posited.  To make the political
process of fiscal policy determination rich, interesting, and tractable, we use a median voter
framework1 with voter heterogeneity.  Voter heterogeneity is introduced by assuming a
distribution of genetic ability levels for the working generation.  The ability level of the
individual will, in turn, determine the value she receives from a publicly provided good such as
education.
Finally the third aspect of our modeling strategy is a focus on transitions between pre-
aging and post-aging steady states.  We first introduce demographic change in one country
(signifying more developed regions) as a drop in their population growth rate.  Consistent with
the worldwide aging trend in Figure 1, the population growth rate drops in the other country
(signifying developing regions) as well after two model periods.  Population growth rates of the
two countries are equal in both the initial and the final steady states2.  Therefore, our analysis is
of transition between these two steady states.
6Our model extends the basic Diamond overlapping generations model3 in two ways.
First, it is a two-country world economy model similar to Buiter (1981) in which countries are
perfectly symmetric in the initial steady state equilibrium.  Second, it models political decision
making for fiscal policy in order to examine political economy related effects of aging.  With an
increase in the dependency ratio,4 fiscal policy shifts towards the preferences of the older
generation.  This combines with the effect of international capital mobility when demographic
asymmetries (different population growth rates) between countries or regions are present.
Internationally mobile capital is the intermediary in spreading the effects of aging globally.  For
clarity, we first present the model for one country only.  Then we describe the two-country world
equilibrium.  However, this analysis also applies in an asymmetric, two-region model.
Household Behavior
Individuals live for two periods and seek to maximize a lifetime utility function,
1
1ln ln ,
1jt jt
U C C +
 
= +  + δ  (1)
here j indexes individuals, jtC  is consumption when young, and 1+jtC  is consumption when old.
The period-specific budget constraints in the first and the second periods are:
First period: ( ) ( ) ( )jt j jt j t t t jC a S a w h a+ = θ
Second Period: ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 11 , jt j t t jt jC a r S a+ + += + θ (2)
here ( )t 1 tθ = − τ , th  is the human capital of the individual, ja  is the ability level of individual j,
and τ is the rate of income taxation.
Tax policy is a flat tax on the labor income of the young and the capital income of the
old.  Capital income taxation follows a source-based system.  I also assume there is a continuous
distribution of abilities that is replicated in each new generation.  The ability level of individual j
7is denoted by ja .  This ranges from 0 to 1 and the density function of abilities is denoted by f(a)
where by definition:
( )
1
0
1 .f a da =∫  (3)
Human capital is accumulated from the interaction of ability level (a) of the individual and
government spending per worker (g):
( ) 1 . j j tth a a g ψ = Φ +  (4)
The form of the human capital function is chosen so that individuals with the lowest ability
( 0)ja =  will contribute to the economy in terms of human capital (see Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and
Tosun 2000).  From the maximization of (1) subject to (2) and (4); we get the familiar first order
condition:
( ) ( ) ( )11 1
1
.  
1jt j jt jt t
C a C a
r
+
+ +
+ δ
=
+ θ
(5)
Using (5) and (2), we derive the optimal saving of an individual j:
( ) ( )12jt j t t t jS a w h a= θ+ δ . (6)
Saving of an individual depends on net labor earnings but it is independent of the interest rate.
This is due to the Cobb-Douglas form of the utility function.  Given (5) and (6), it is easy to
derive consumption functions in each period:
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )1 11
1
2
                                                                                      
1
.
2
jt j t t t j
t t t t t j
jt j
C a w h a
r w h a
C a + ++
+ δ
= θ
+ δ
+ θ θ
=
+ δ
(7)
8Political Process
The consumption and saving decisions, as seen above, depend on human capital, which is
in turn determined by government spending (see equation 4).  By plugging these into (1), we get
the indirect utility function which each voter maximizes in determining his or her preferred tax
rate, subject to the government budget constraint ( ).t t ty gτ =   The preferred tax rate of individual
j when young is:
( ) ( )
1
 .  
1
j t
jt j
j t
a y
a
a y
ψ −
τ =
+ ψ
(8)
Equation (8) is the tax rate each individual prefers based on her ability level.  This preferred tax
rate is increasing in both ability level a and in aggregate income y.  Because the old do not derive
any benefit from publicly provided education and there are no bequests in the model, they incur a
cost without enjoying any benefits.  Therefore, their preferred tax rate will always be zero,
regardless of their ability.
At each period of the model, a cohort of size Nt is born.  Then total population in each
period is tt NN +−1  where ( ) 11t t tN N −= + η  and tη  is the population growth rate at period t.
Given this, the median voter is defined by
( ) 11
0
,
2
m
t t
t t
N NN N f a da −
−
+
+ =∫ (9)
here m is the ability level of the median voter.
With population aging, the median voter becomes a lower ability person (see
Appendix II) and the preferred tax rate of the median voter is lower.  The intuition behind this is
as follows: as the population ages (dependency ratio rises), older people will need fewer young
voters to form a majority.  These young voters are the ones at the lower end of the ability
9distribution.  They prefer lower taxes than higher ability people because their return from public
education is lower.
Producers’ Behavior
Each country produces a single good using a Cobb-Douglas production technology.
1
 ,t t tY H K
β −β
= Λ (10)
here K  is capital stock and H  is aggregate supply of human capital.  The aggregate supply of
human capital is:
( ) ( )
1
0
.t tH N h a f a da= ∫ (11)
Competitive factor markets require that real wage and interest rates are equal to the marginal
products of labor and capital respectively.  Therefore, factor demand equations are:
1
 
t
t
t
k
w
h
−β 
= βΛ    (12)
( )1  .tt
t
k
r
h
−β 
= −β Λ    (13)
Here, / and /t t t t t tk K N h H N= =  are capital stock per worker and human capital per worker,
respectively.  Human capital per worker, using (4) and (11), is
( ) ( )
1
0
1 .t th ag f a daψ= Φ +∫ (14)
Using (6) and (14), we can express saving per worker as
( ) ( )
1
0
1 1 .
2t t t t
s w ag f a daψ = θ Φ + + δ  ∫ (15)
World Equilibrium
To close our dynamic model, we must specify an international goods market condition
and an international capital flow constraint.  I assume there is perfect international financial
10
capital mobility.  In each country, claims to domestic and foreign capital are perfect substitutes.
International goods market equilibrium requires that world saving is equal to world investment.
The domestic capital stock per worker may be higher (lower) than the domestic saving per
worker, implying international capital flows.  Writing this in per worker terms, international
goods market equilibrium implies:
( )
( )
( )
( )
0
1 1
1 1
0 11
1
0
11
.
11 1
t
B
B iAt
iA B Bt i
t t ttAA
Ai ti
i
i
sk k s
≠
+
=
+ +
= ++
+
=
 
+ η  + η   + = +
+ η+ η     + η  
∏
∏
∏
(16)
Here I assume that initial population sizes are the same in both countries (i.e., 0 0A BN N= ).
In our model, capital income is taxed where income is earned.  Thus, we employ a source-based
system of capital income taxation for both countries.  This implies that net-of-tax interest rates
are equalized in equilibrium.  Therefore, the international capital flow constraint is:
( ) ( )B1 1 1 t 11 1  A A Bt t tr r+ + + +− τ = − τ (17)
Capital will move between countries until both (16) and (17) obtain.  We complete our
two-country model by introducing balance of payments identities. Balance of payments accounts
are especially important in tracing the saving-investment imbalances between countries.  Since
this is a two-country model, balance of payments of the two countries must sum to zero.
Therefore, we have A Bt tCA CA= − , 
A B
t tBOT BOT= − , and 
A B
t tFI FI= − ; where CA , BOT , and
FI  stand for current account, balance of trade, and net foreign income, respectively.  The current
account is defined as the difference between national product and domestic absorption.  National
product consists of domestic product and net foreign income.  Domestic absorption equals the
sum of consumption and domestic capital accumulation less taxes. I assume that the consumption
good can move costlessly between countries.  Given this definition, the current account equation
can be written as.5
11
( ) ( ) ( )1 21 1 11 1 11 1
t t
t t t t t t t t t t
t t
s cCA y r k c k k− + +
 
= − τ + − τ − − − − + η −    + η + η 
(18)
The current account is the sum of balance of trade and net foreign income
( t t tCA BOT FI= + ).6  Because this is a one-sector model, “international trade and international
lending and borrowing are part and parcel of the same transaction” (Buiter 1981).  The only way
for a country to consume and invest more than it produces (have a trade deficit) is to hold a net
ownership of claims on foreign capital (receive positive net foreign income).
The Experiment
To focus on the role of demographic transition, I assume that the countries are initially
identical.  As a benchmark, country A is the country that undergoes demographic transition first
and it has a lower population growth rate than country B in the first two periods.  Country B’s
population growth rate decreases to country A’s growth rate in the third period and the two
growth rates are equalized thereafter.  Because the population growth rate changes, the ability
level of the median voter also changes.  This leads to a change in government spending for
education, human capital accumulation, capital accumulation, and income per worker.  Thus, a
change in the ability level of the median voter through demographic shift induces an economic
transition.  As shown in the appendix, when the population growth rate falls (increased
dependency ratio), the ability level of the median voter goes down as well.  All else equal, this
political transition would reduce provision of the public good.  However, if the tax rate
decreases, national saving, and thus, physical capital accumulation will be enhanced.  This may
create a positive effect on income per worker, government spending per worker and human
capital per worker.  When the feedback effect from human capital accumulation dominates the
negative effect of a lower preferred tax rate, demographic shift may induce higher income per
worker, higher capital stock per worker, and higher human capital and government spending per
12
worker.  However, in an international setting changes in the interest rate in the aging country due
to changes in income per worker and capital per worker may lead to capital flows between
countries.  In the next section, I will examine the transition effects of aging on capital
accumulation in both countries.  I will also address the issue of stability of the dynamic system.
Transition Dynamics in Response to Population Aging
Stability and Capital Stock Transitions
Transitions can be examined by tracing the behavior of the capital stock over time.  For
this analytical approach, we totally differentiate the equations given by (8), (10), and (12)
through (15) for each country, and (16) and (17), which can be reduced to a vector difference
equation:
1
ˆ
t t tF F N+ = Ω + Ω (19)
where



=
+
+
+ B
t
A
t
t dk
dk
F
1
1
1 ,
A
t
t B
t
dk
F
dk
 
=   
,










=
+
+
B
t
A
t
B
t
A
t
t
d
d
d
d
N
1
1
η
η
η
η
and



=Ω
MM
MM
,  








−+
+−
=Ω
1
3
2
1
3
244
1
3
2
1
3
244
ˆ
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
ZZZ
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
ZZZ
The vector difference equation (19) is used for two purposes.  First, for a constant
population growth across periods, it can be used to examine the stability of the dynamic system.
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Ω  summarizes the relationship between tk  and 1+tk .  Secondly, for a given capital stock in
period t , we examine the effect of a change in the population growth rate on the capital stock in
period 1+t .  I will address each of these below.
In order to analyze the stability of the dynamic system, we examine the matrix Ω  in
which 
1
1
2
y
M
P
∗
τ∗
 τ
α − ε 
− τ 
= , and ( ) ( )1 1 1hg yP τ = − − α ε + ε   in M .  Political equilibrium is
locally stable when 0>P  and the system is dynamically stable when 12 <M  (see appendix for
derivation of the stability conditions).7  In line with our benchmark experiment described above,
we can see how the dynamic system will reach a steady state after a demographic transition.
Expanding (19) for a fixed level of initial capital stock per worker, we can write (19) for
2,1,0=t as:
1 0 0
2
2 0 0 1
3 2
3 0 0 1 2
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ
F F N
F F N N
F F N N N
= Ω + Ω
= Ω + Ω Ω + Ω
= Ω + Ω Ω + Ω Ω + Ω
(20)
Then generalizing this for 2>t ,
1 1
1 0 0 1 1
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
...
t t t
t t tF F N N N N
+ −
+ −= Ω + Ω Ω + Ω Ω + + ΩΩ + Ω (21)
where 


=


=
0
0
0
0
0 B
A
dk
dk
F .
Notice that the coefficients of the terms in (21) resemble a geometric series.  In line with our
assumptions regarding the demographic transition we can assume that 3 4 1... t tN N N N−= = = = .
Using this, we can write (21) as:
1 2 0 1 2 3
1 0 1 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ... )t t t tt tF N N N N− − −+ = Ω Ω + Ω Ω + Ω Ω + Ω + Ω + Ω + Ω Ω (22)
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As t → ∞ , the first three terms in the above expression converge to zero and since all the
elements of the matrix Ω  is less than 1 by dynamic local stability, the geometric series in
parentheses converges to ( ) 1−Ω−I .  Thus, assuming that A Bt td d dη = η = η  (identical changes in
the steady state population growth rates), as ∞→t , (22) can be written as:
( ) 11 ˆt
t
F I N−+
→∞
= − Ω Ω (23)
By using Ω , and Ωˆ , and converting (23) back to the scalar form, we get the increase in capital
per worker from the initial steady state to the post-demographic transition steady state8:
( )2 42
1 2
A B Z Zdk dk
d d M
+
= =
η η −
(24)
where
( )2 2 1
kZ
∗
∗
−
=
+ η
,
and
( )
( )4 2
1 1
1 1
2 1
y
hg a as s P
Z
P
∗ ∗
τ∗ ∗
τ τ∗ ∗
∗ ∗
 ε τ τ
−α ε ε − − ε  
− τ − τ 
=
η + η
2Z  is negative, while the sign of 4Z  is indeterminate which makes the sign of the
derivatives in (24) indeterminate9.  2Z  is the “direct saving effect”10 of a change in the
population growth rate on capital per worker for a given ability of median voter.  Holding the
ability of the median voter fixed, a decrease in the population growth rate increases capital per
worker by spreading the same saving over fewer workers.  4Z  is the “indirect saving effect”
11
 of
a change in the ability of median voter on capital per worker.  A decrease in the median voter’s
ability, triggered by a decrease in the population growth rate, decreases wage income ( wh ) while
decreasing the tax rate.  Thus, the net effect on net labor income and saving depends on the
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relative magnitudes of the effects on wage income and the tax rate.  The total effect of a decrease
in the population growth rate on the steady state capital per worker depends on how the political
economy related effect ( 4Z ) compares to the direct saving effect ( 2Z ).12  Notice that 4Z
depends on the elasticity of the preferred tax rate with respect to income per worker ( )yτε ,
elasticity of the preferred tax rate with respect to median voter’s ability ( )aτε , and the elasticity
of human capital with respect to government spending per worker  ( ).hgε 13  When 0aτε = , 4Z  is
also equal to zero and steady state capital per worker unambiguously increases with a decrease in
η .  This is because zero elasticity eliminates completely the feedback effects from an
endogenous fiscal policy.  4Z  is increasing in hgε  which means that a decrease in government
spending decreases human capital per worker more as hgε  gets bigger, leading to a greater
decrease in labor income, ceteris paribus.
Using (19) and (21) for both countries, the dynamic solution of capital per worker caused
by a change in the population growth at any period during transition is given by:
1 1 3 1 1 3
2 2
1 1 1 1 1 1
A B A B
t t t t
A B B A
t t t t
dk dk Z dk dk ZZ Z
d d Z d d Z
+ + + +
+ + + +
   
= = − = = +   η η η η    (25)
( )1 1 1 1 2 42
A A B B
t t t t
A B B A
t t t t
dk dk dk dk MZ Z
d d d d
+ + + +
= = = = +
η η η η
(26)
where
( ) ( )2
1 2
2 1 1yy Py
Z
k P
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
τ
∗
  α −τ −ε τ − −τ  
= ,
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )3
1 1 1
1 1
a y a y
y
P y y P
Z
k P
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
τ τ τ τ
∗ ∗ ∗
τ
 
− α ε −τ +ε τ −α ε τ +ε 
=
+ε +η η
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In equation (25), 1Z  is the “direct net interest rate effect”14 (through capital changes) of a
change in the population growth rate in one country and it is negative under the stability
conditions15.  For a given ability of the median voter, an increase in capital per worker in one
country depresses the net interest rate, which in turn has a negative effect on capital
accumulation in that country, ceteris paribus.
3Z  is the “indirect net interest rate effect” through a change in median voter’s ability.
The sign of 3Z  is indeterminate which makes the signs of the derivatives in (25) indeterminate as
well.  For a given level of capital, a decrease in the median voter’s ability decreases the marginal
productivity of capital by decreasing income, thus creating a negative effect on the net interest
rate.  However, it also decreases the tax rate, thus creating a counter effect on the net interest
rate.  Considering these together, 13 ZZ can be interpreted as the net interest rate effect of a
change in median voter’s ability on capital per worker after controlling for the effect of capital
stock changes on the interest rate ( 1Z ).
We see in (25) that a change in one country’s population growth rate has opposite effects
on capital accumulation in two countries.  This is due to the change in the net interest rate in one
country.  The momentary interest rate differential between the two countries will be eliminated
by the flow of capital from the country with the lower net interest rate to the one with the higher
one.  To give an example, holding other effects constant, a decrease in the population growth in
only country A at any point in time will decrease the net interest rate in country A as long as the
decrease in tax rate is outweighed by the decrease in the interest rate.  This, in turn will cause
country A capital to flow to country B until the net interest rates are equalized.  Notice that when
0aτε = , 3Z  is also equal to zero which drives the net interest rate effect ( 13 ZZ ) to zero.  In
addition to the interest rate effects mentioned above, capital per worker in period t+1 is also
affected by saving in period t.  Therefore, a change in population growth rate in period t will
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affect capital per worker in period t+1 through a saving effect.  This is depicted in (26).  The
argument is similar to the one for steady state changes.  With a decrease in the population growth
rate, the direct saving effect controlled for capital growth in period t ( 22MZ ) increases capital
per worker in period t+1 for a given level of median voter’s ability.  However, a decrease in
median voter’s ability will also affect saving by decreasing both the labor income and the tax
rate, causing the net effect to be ambiguous.
The Role of Capital Mobility and Endogenous Fiscal Policy in Capital Stock
Transitions
In order to explore the significance of open economy and endogenous fiscal policy
effects, we compare the effects in (25) and (26) with analytic results from two alternative
versions of this model.  A comparison with closed economy shows the influence of capital
mobility, while a comparison with an exogenous policy model indicates the importance of
endogenous fiscal policy.  Solutions for these models are:
Closed economy model:  1 2
1
2
c
c
A
t
A
t
dk Z
d
+
+
=
η
 and ( )1 2 42 2 .
cA
t
cA
t
dk MZ Z
d
+
= +
η
(27)
Exogenous fiscal policy model: 1 1 1 1 2
1 1 1 1
f f f f
f f f f
A A B B
t t t t
A B A B
t t t t
dk dk dk dk Z
d d d d
+ + + +
+ + + +
= = = =
η η η η
(28)
1 1 1 1
22 .
f f f f
f f f f
A A B B
ft t t t
A B A B
t t t t
dk dk dk dk M Z
d d d d
+ + + +
= = = =
η η η η
(29)
Comparing (25) and (26) with (27), we see that both the direct saving effect ( 2Z ), and the
indirect saving effect ( 4Z ) are shared equally between the two countries when these economies
are open.  The interesting point here is that this result is independent of which country ages.
Therefore, we can say that, by spreading the effects of aging between countries, internationally
mobile capital partially offsets the effect of population aging that comes from its effects (direct
and indirect) on saving.  Comparing (25) and (26) with (27)-(29), we also see that the net interest
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rate effect ( 13 ZZ ) is unique to our model, making this a combined effect of capital mobility and
endogenous fiscal policy.  Since this effect changes capital per worker in A and B in opposite
directions, it is a major factor in creating an asymmetry between the two countries throughout the
demographic transition.  Through this effect, the pattern as well as the size of the effect of aging
may change.
The analytical exercise above clearly indicates the importance of examining aging in an
open economy setting.  However, we would like to know both the direction and the magnitude of
these effects and how sensitive they are to model parameters.  In the next section, we present the
results from a simulation of these models.
Simulation of Transition Effects
The simulation study consists of transition analysis of population aging in both countries
at different time periods. We assume that both countries are at an identical steady state in period
0.  Population aging is simulated by a decrease in the population growth rate (or an increase in
the dependency ratio) from an annual 2 percent rate to an annual 1 percent rate.  In our
benchmark simulation, country A ages starting at period 1 while country B retains its
demographic structure until period 3.  The population growth rates between the two countries are
equalized in period 3 and thereafter.  The parameter values used in the numerical simulation are
shown in Table 1.  Notice that two parameters, the rate of time preference in the utility
specification and the population growth rate, are adjusted to the length of the model period (30
years).  In these simulations, we assume that the ability level, a, is distributed uniformly on the
interval [0,1].  These parameter values and the timing of population aging mentioned above
describe the benchmark simulation.  A series of sensible values for the share of capital in output
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( α ) and for the efficiency of education in raising human capital ( ψ ) are chosen to conduct a
sensitivity analysis as explained in a later section.
Simulation Results
As exposited above, with an increase in the dependency ratio older people will form a
majority with fewer young people at the lower end of the ability distribution.  Therefore, the
ability of the median voter is lower than in country A, but unchanged in country B until period 3,
after which it is the same in both countries.  Figure 2 shows the implications of this on the
preferred tax rate.  In both countries, the tax rate decreases in the first period of their aging trend.
We also see tax rate increases in both countries following this first period.  This is due to income
growth (see below) in both countries, and the fact that the preferred tax rate exhibits positive
income elasticity.  In our model, the lower tax rate in the aging country, ceteris paribus, causes
lower government spending and this causes deterioration in human capital accumulation.  We see
in Figure 3 that human capital per worker decreases in country A in period 1 and in country B in
period 3.  However, again due to income growth, human capital increases in both countries
following their first period of aging, and both countries end up with a higher steady state human
capital per worker.
Above, we have shown that the effect of a decrease in population growth rate on capital
per worker is indeterminate due to the political economy of a changing median voter.  Figure 4
shows that with the parameter values chosen for simulation, the capital stock per worker
increases in both countries throughout the entire transition.  After the first demographic shock in
country A, the abundance of capital per worker compared to a decreasing human capital per
worker depresses the domestic interest rate in country A.  At a lower interest rate, demand for
capital increases in country B, causing capital to flow to country B.  Capital per worker is higher
in country B than in country A during the first two periods because the decrease in the ability of
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median voter in A depresses the net interest rate (Figure 5) in A even further causing more
capital to flow to country B.  The second demographic shock, which takes place in country B in
period 3, boosts capital accumulation in both countries.  The increase in capital per worker in the
second shock is larger because both economies are growing prior to the second shock.
For a better understanding of the capital movements between countries, we examine the
changes in the balance of payments accounts.  We graph only the balance of payments of country
A, as the balance of payments accounts in country B are just the opposite of country A.  Due to
our perfect foresight assumption, the decrease in country A’s population growth rate in period 1
leads to a drop in period 0 domestic investment.  We see in Figure 6 that starting at a zero net
foreign income, this generates a current account surplus for country A in periods 0 and 1.  Thus,
capital moves from country A to country B from period 0 to period 2.  This explains the increase
in the capital stock per worker in country B in the first two periods as we have seen in Figure 4.
This also leads to positive net foreign income for country A in periods 1 and 2.  With the arrival
of the second demographic shock, however, country A incurs a large trade and current account
deficit in period 2.  This means that capital flows from country B back to country A from
period 2 to period 3, leading to greater increase in capital stock per worker in country A in
period 3.  Also, in period 3, country A has negative net foreign income and a trade surplus.
Because trade surplus outweighs negative net foreign income, country A has a current account
surplus and capital flows from country A to country B again.  However, since economic
variables converge rapidly to their new steady state values after period 4, current accounts and
trade accounts of both countries are balanced thereafter.
These results for capital per worker and human capital per worker tell us how income
responds to the demographic transition.  For the first demographic shock, due to the capital
inflow to country B until period 2, both capital and human capital per worker increase in country
B leading to an increase in income per worker in the first two periods.  On the other hand, even
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though the capital per worker increases in A, human capital per worker decreases in period 1.
The income transitions in Figure 7 show that the decrease in human capital dominates, leading to
a decrease in the income per worker in country A in the first period.  In the second period
however, due to both capital and human per worker increases, income per worker increases in
country A.  When the second demographic shock hits country B, unlike the first shock, we see
income growth in both countries.  Thus, country B does not experience the same income
deterioration as country A did in the first shock even though the shock itself is identical in both
cases.  This interesting result, which is a clear indication of asymmetric economic transitions of
countries aging at different times, can be explained by the observation that economies are
growing prior to the second demographic shock.16  Therefore, this “growth effect” partially
offsets the adverse effects of population aging for country B.
Welfare effects of aging can be examined by defining welfare in period t  as the lifetime
welfare of a person of generation t .17  Welfare of this person is composed of her consumption
when young (in period t ) and consumption when old (in period 1+t ).  In order to examine
welfare effects, we derive an indirect utility function by substituting consumption solutions in (7)
into (1), and we integrate this over the ability distribution.  To understand welfare changes, we
will first examine consumption transitions.  In Figure 8, we see that consumption of old persons
of generations 0 and 2 decreases in both countries immediately after the two shocks. On the other
hand, consumption of young persons of all generations increases in both countries throughout the
entire demographic transition.  The decrease in the consumption of old has to do with the perfect
foresight assumption in our overlapping generations model.  In periods 0 and 2, consumers
internalize the steep decrease in the net of tax interest rate (see Figure 5) in periods 1 and 3.
Thus, young persons who save in periods 0 and 2 will consume less from a given level of savings
in their old age in periods 1 and 3.  This result explains welfare changes in periods 0 and 2.
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Figure 9 shows that welfare levels of generations 0 and 2 drop in both countries.
However, notice that the decrease in welfare in period 2 is less pronounced than the decrease in
period 0.  The answer to this puzzle lies at the increase in consumption of young in period 2,
which is again the consequence of an already growing economy prior to the second shock.  As
hinted by the simulation results in this section, international capital mobility and the political
economy of a changing median voter are the key factors in understanding the effects of
population aging on the economic transitions of countries.  In the following section, we will
sharpen our understanding by comparing the results presented above with the results from
alternative versions of our model.
Comparison with Alternative Versions
We begin, in Table 2, by comparing the effects of demographic transitions in an open
world economy to those in a world without capital mobility.  We see that open economy results
in columns (3), (4), and (5) are considerably different from the closed economy results in
columns (1) and (2).  The open economy results with exogenous fiscal policy in column 3 are
identical for both countries.  As mentioned in the analytical section, by affecting capital
accumulation in both countries in opposite directions, a politically determined fiscal policy
single-handedly creates asymmetric results for countries.  On the other hand, comparing the
closed economy results with the open economy results, we see that capital mobility acts as a
shock absorber, spreading the effects of aging to both economies.  While capital flows smooth
consumption and welfare in country A for the first demographic shock, they smooth
consumption and welfare in country B for the second shock.  These results suggest that the
interaction of open economy and endogenous fiscal policy changes the size of the effects of
aging in a considerable way.
An even more striking result is that it is possible to change the pattern as well as the size
of these effects.  Aging increases country A’s income per worker in closed economy version, but
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it decreases first period income per worker in country A in our open economy model with
endogenous fiscal policy.  The explanation lies in the relatively smaller increase in the first
period capital stock and greater decrease in first period human capital and government spending
per worker in country A.  Another change is seen in welfare transitions.  Unlike the closed
economy results, the open economy results in columns (3) and (4) show that the welfare of
generation 0 in country in B and welfare of generation 2 in country A both decrease because of
the decreases in old age consumption.
Finally, results in columns (3)-(5) show that there are transition asymmetries between the
first and the second demographic shocks.  In terms of welfare, both countries are better off in the
second shock compared to the first one.  This can be explained by the economic growth that is
taking place prior to the second demographic shock.  Therefore, even though the demographic
shocks are symmetric (a decrease in population growth from 2 percent to 1 percent), the
economic transitions are not.
Sensitivity Analysis
The simulations, described in the previous sections, are based on the parameter values
presented in Table 1.  Among those, the parameter of the human capital function ( ψ ), which can
be interpreted as the return, in terms of human capital, from government spending, is an
important aspect of the model and the welfare results.  Accordingly, in Table 3 we present the
results of a sensitivity analysis for ψ .  Higher values of ψ  are associated with higher values of
the elasticity of human capital with respect to government spending per worker ( )hgε  and lower
values of the elasticity of the preferred tax rate with respect to median voter’s ability ( )aτε .
Thus, for a high value of ψ , there will be a relatively smaller decline in the tax rate and
government spending from a decrease in median voter’s ability, while there will be a relatively
greater human capital feedback from government spending for a given ability level.  We see in
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columns (5) and (6) that, for  0.7,ψ =  countries overall have more favorable transitions,
indicated by capital, income and welfare growth throughout the transition periods.  However, for
0.35,ψ =  the decrease in government spending and human capital due to a decrease in median
voter’s ability is so large that there is even a decrease in capital per worker in period 2 in both
countries.  This leads to substantial welfare deterioration in periods 1 and 2 for country A and in
period 2 for country B.
The qualitative results from the previous section are overall robust to different values of
ψ .  Our qualitative results are also robust to an alternative utility function.  Simulations for a
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA) utility function18 change only the size of the results
presented in Table 3.  However, our sensitivity analysis shows that while the open economy is
more likely to change the pattern of the closed economy results for lower values of ψ ,
consumption and welfare smoothing effect of capital mobility is more apparent for higher values
of .ψ   Finally, conditioned on previous capital growth, both countries are better off in the second
demographic shock compared to the first one, in terms of their welfare reactions.
Alternative Aging Scenarios for Developing Regions
The old-age dependency ratios in Figure 1 are based on population projections for more
developed and developing regions in the next one hundred and fifty years.  What happens if
developing regions age sooner or later than embodied in these projections?  Is the timing of
developing country aging really important?  This section addresses the implications of the timing
of demographic shocks.  We consider two alternative scenarios.  In the first scenario, country B
ages a period sooner, so the second demographic shock is introduced in period 2 rather than in
period 3.  In the second scenario, country B ages a period later, so the shock is introduced in
period 4.  Figures 10 and 11 show the welfare transitions for country A and country B under
these alternative aging scenarios.
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The pattern of the effects changes significantly with the timing of aging.  In the early
aging scenario, both countries enjoy higher welfare after period 1 compared to other scenarios.
Whereas in the late aging scenario, there is considerable welfare reduction for both countries in
period 3.  This scenario produces the lowest welfare transition in both countries after period 2
compared to other scenarios.  This unattractive implication can be understood by examining the
capital stock transitions in Figures 12 and 13.  After an initial boost from the first demographic
shock, capital per worker actually decreases in both countries in period 3 in our late aging
scenario.  The main reason for this is that the effect of an initial increase in savings that drives
capital accumulation (direct saving effect) dissipates and diminishes over time unless there is
another similar shock.  We see that the decrease in capital per worker occurs one period before
the second demographic shock.  We also see that capital per worker increases again in both
countries in period 4.  These findings suggest that the timing of developing country aging has
strong welfare implications for both countries in their transitions to a new steady state.  An early
aging scenario seems to provide favorable welfare transitions for both countries.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the transition effects of a worldwide trend in population aging
in more developed regions that is expected to be followed by developing regions in the near
future.  By changing the political balances in favor of the preferences of older generations,
population aging has a direct impact on government spending policy.  This triggers changes in
the economy of both the aging country and other regions through the medium of internationally
mobile capital.  The analytical and numerical simulation exercises show that capital mobility and
an endogenous fiscal policy together have a substantial influence on the economic transitions of
aging countries.  While capital mobility has consumption and welfare smoothing effects,
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endogenous fiscal policy is the key factor in creating asymmetries between regions.  Our results
also show that even though the demographic shocks that we considered are symmetric, the
reactions to these shocks are quite different.  The second demographic shock overall produces
more favorable economic outcomes for both regions.  Finally, in an attempt to examine the
implications of the timing of developing country aging, we considered an early aging and a late
aging scenario.  Our simulations indicate that an early aging scenario is more beneficial, in terms
of long term welfare, for both regions.
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Appendix
I. Stability
Stability of the Political Equilibrium
The political equilibrium is locally stable if starting from a given level of government
spending (g), the economy moves automatically to an equilibrium (Holtz-Eakin, Lovely, and
Tosun 2000).  For an analysis of stability, I assume a Marshallian-type adjustment rule:
( )1pdg c g
dt
τ 
= − = ϕ τ 
(A.1)
In this expression c is a positive constant.  The variable τ is the actual tax rate, which is a
function of government spending per worker and income per worker.  The variable pτ  is median
voter’s preferred tax rate for a given level of government spending and income.  Equation (A.1)
states that if median voter’s preferred tax rate exceeds actual tax rate, government spending will
rise.  For a political equilibrium, ( )ˆ 0gϕ = and g is locally stable if and only if ( ) 0g′ϕ <  (where
g is the equilibrium level of government spending).  Differentiating (8), (10) and (14) in the text,
we get:
( )1 1t hg y tpd dgy τ∗τ = − α ε ε (A.2)
Differentiating the government budget constraint ( )t t ty gτ =  and using the differentiated form of
(10), we get:
( )1 1 hg
t td dgy∗
 − − α ε τ = (A.3)
Finally, differentiating (A.1) and using (A.2) and (A.3), we get the stability condition for
political equilibrium:
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( ) ( )1 1 1 0hg yτ − − α ε + ε >  (A.4)
This makes P  in the text positive.
Stability of the Intertemporal Equilibrium
B.1     Intertemporal stability requires that the eigen value of the matrix 2 2xΩ  in (19) is less than
1 in absolute value.  Eigen value is found by solving 0IΩ − λ = , where λ  is the eigen value and
2 2xI  is the identity matrix.  The two possible values of λ are:
0=λ  or 
P
M
y 


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−
−
==
∗
∗
τε
τ
τ
α
λ 1
1
2 (A.5)
Using the nonzero root, the intertemporal stability requires:
1
1
1 or 2 1
y
M
P
∗
τ∗
 τ
α − ε 
− τ λ < = <
However, since 1yτ
− τ
ε <
τ
 (as shown in the proof below) and 0>P  by political stability, M2 is
positive and the intertemporal stability condition can be written as:
1
1 y
P
∗
τ∗
 τ
α − ε < 
− τ  (A.6)
B.2     02 >M
Proof by contradiction: Let  1yτ
− τ
ε ≥
τ
,
Since 1
1y m yτ
ε =
ψ −
and
1 1 1
1m y
≥ −
ψ − τ
,
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then
( )1
1 1
mym y
m y m y
+ ψψ ≥
ψ − ψ −
which can not be true since 1 0m yψ − > and 0ψ > , 0m > , 0y > .
Then 1yτ
− τ
ε <
τ
 which implies 02 >M .
II. The Effect of Increasing Dependency Ratio on the Ability Level
of the Median Voter
Recall that median voter is defined by  ( ) 11
0 2
m
t t
t t
N NN N f a da −
−
+
+ =∫ .  Rewriting this:
( ) ( ) 11 0 2
t t
t t t
N NN N F m N F −
−
+
+ − = , dividing both sides by 1−tN :
( ) ( ){ } 21 (1 ) 0 2 tt F m F
+ η
+ + η − =  which can be rearranged as ( ) ( ) ( )0 2 1
t
t
F m F η− =
+ η
.
Differentiating both sides we get, ( ) ( )( )2
2 1 2
4 1
t t t t
t
d d
F m dm
+ η η − η η
′ =
+ η
.  Finally this can be
rearranged as ( ) ( )2
( )
2
4 1t t
dm
d F m
+
=
η ′ + η
 which is positive.  Therefore, with a decrease in the
population growth rate the ability level of the median voter decreases.
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“Policy Evaluation with Computable General Equilibrium Models,” University of Genova, Italy,
29-30 October, 1999.  I also thank Syracuse University Economics/Public Administration
Graduate Seminar participants.  All errors are my responsibility.
1. The political process can be modeled using a median voter framework because the
conditions for the median voter theorem are satisfied.  The choice of voters is over a
single dimension since the preferred tax rate is the only choice variable.  The preferences
are single peaked.
2. In a world with divergent population growth, the region with the higher growth rate
continuously gets bigger than the other region.  In that case, the post-demographic shock
steady state is not defined, making an analytical study impossible.
3. See Diamond (1965)
4. The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of elderly to non-elderly persons,
( ) ( )1 / 1/1t t tN N− = + η  where tη is the population growth rate.  An increase in the
dependency ratio is simulated by an exogenous decrease in the population growth rate
tη .
5. Since the balance of payments accounts are identical in absolute magnitudes, we can take
out the country superscripts and present equations for one country.
6. Balance of trade is the difference between domestic product and domestic absorption and
can be written as:
( ) ( )21 1 11 11
t
t t t t t t t
t
cBOT y c k k+ += − τ − − − + η −  + η
            The net foreign income is earnings from net claims on foreign capital:
( ) 11
1
t
t t t t
t
sFI r k−
 
= − τ − + η 
7. Due to Cobb-Douglas, 1yτ
− τ
ε <
τ
 which means that 120 << M  (see appendix for the
proof).
8. Due to the perfect symmetry of the initial and the final steady states, this open economy
steady state formulation is identical to a one in closed economy.  See Holtz-Eakin,
Lovely and Tosun (2000) for a closed economy analysis.
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9. The denominator of (24) is positive since 12 <M  by dynamic stability.
10. By “direct” effect, we mean an effect independent of the change in the ability level of the
median voter.
11. By “indirect” effect we mean an effect that is driven by a change in median voter’s
ability.  This effect carries the political economy of population aging.
12. See Holtz-Eakin, Lovely and Tosun (2000) for a detailed analysis of this comparison.
13.
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 1
1
1 1
g g
hg
g
ψ ∗ ∗+ ψ − +  ε = ψ + ∗+ −  
 and 1
1y m y
ε =
τ ψ −
14. Net Interest rate effects embodied in 1Z  and 3Z  are different from the saving related
effects ( 2Z  and 4Z ) because saving is independent of interest rate due to Cobb-Douglas
utility.
15.
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
2
1 2 2
2 1 1
2 1 1 1
0
y
y
y P
y Py
Z
k P k P
∗
τ∗ ∗
∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗
τ
∗ ∗
  ε τ 
−τ α − −   α −τ −ε τ − −τ −τ        
= = <  since 
*
*
1 (1 )
y Pτ
 ε τ
α − < 
− τ  
by dynamic stability.
16. In contrast, we assume that both economies are at a steady state prior to the first
demographic shock.
17. Generation t  refers to persons who are young in period t  and old in period 1+t .
18. Unlike Cobb-Douglas, saving in the CRRA utility case is a function of the interest rate:
1 1
.1 11 (1 ) (1 )
i i i
jt
t t
w hS
r + +
θ
= γ −
+ + δ + θ
γ γ
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Table1.    Benchmark Values of the Parameters Used in the
Two-Country OLG Model
Rates Translated into
One-Period (30 Years) Annual Rate
Rate of time preference ( )δ 2.24 0.04
Population growth rate ( )η 0.55 0.02
Elasticity of human capital w.r.t. inputs of
ability and government spending ( )ψ
0.50
Elasticity of output w.r.t. capital ( )α 0.33
Source:  Computed by author.
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Table 2.    Comparisons with Alternative Versionsa
Closed Economy Open Economy
Exogenous Policy Endogenous Policy
Time Periods
Country A
(1)
Country B
(2)
Country A and B
(3)
Country A
(4)
Country B
(5)
1 34.39 0.00 14.67 13.26 15.72
2 13.59 0.00 4.10 3.68 3.59
3 6.25 34.39 21.87 23.55 21.02
4 2.93 13.59 9.05 9.13 9.13
Capital stock per
worker
steady state 71.42 71.42 69.39 71.42 71.42
1 -3.09 0.00 0.00 -8.42 3.87
2 4.19 0.00 0.00 1.22 0.92
3 1.94 -3.09 0.00 7.17 -5.23
4 0.91 4.19 0.00 2.82 2.82
Human capital
per worker
steady state 4.73 4.73 0.00 4.73 4.73
1 7.95 0.00 4.62 -1.77 7.64
2 7.20 0.00 1.33 2.03 1.79
3 3.35 7.95 6.74 12.32 2.74
4 1.57 7.20 2.90 4.86 4.86
Income per
worker
steady state 23.22 23.22 19.00 23.22 23.22
1 -7.25 0.00 0.00 =19.22 9.41
2 10.33 0.00 0.00 3.03 2.17
3 4.66 -7.25 0.00 18.27 -11.94
4 2.17 10.33 0.00 6.85 6.85
Government
spending per
worker
steady state 11.56 11.56 0.00 11.56 11.56
1 13.59 0.00 6.34 4.71 6.98
2 6.26 0.00 1.80 1.74 1.65
3 2.93 13.59 9.06 10.59 8.33
4 1.39 6.26 3.81 4.25 4.25
Consumption of
young
steady state 27.55 27.55 26.05 27.55 27.55
1 -12.24 0.00 -5.75 -5.97 -5.97
2 8.00 0.00 4.51 3.18 5.42
3 3.76 -12.24 -6.49 -6.52 -6.61
4 1.78 8.00 5.10 6.86 4.68
Consumption of
old
Steady state 1.73 1.73 0.53 1.73 1.73
0 -3.93 0.00 -1.80 -1.90 -1.90
1 16.25 0.00 7.79 5.60 8.81
2 7.54 -3.93 -0.29 -0.36 -0.46
3 3.52 16.25 10.76 13.03 9.81
4 1.66 7.54 4.49 5.10 5.10
Welfare
steady state 28.31 28.31 26.25 28.31 28.31
     
aAll numbers are percentage changes from the previous period.  Numbers for steady state indicate percentage
change between the initial and the final steady state.
Source:  Computed by author.
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Table 3.    Sensitivity of Similar Results to Various Values of ψ a
ψ 0.35 0.5 0.7
Time
Periods
Country A
(1)
Country B
(2)
Country A
(3)
Country B
(4)
Country A
(5)
Country B
(6)
1 6.70 20.61 13.26 15.72 14.07 15.12
2 -0.95 -0.60 3.68 3.59 6.24 6.20
3 30.72 15.23 23.55 21.02 25.02 23.92
4 5.98 5.98 9.13 9.13 14.08 14.08
Capital stock per
worker
steady state 53.99 53.99 71.42 71.42 113.56 113.56
1 -26.91 3.39 -8.42 3.87 3.37 6.35
2 -0.69 -0.11 1.22 0.92 2.78 2.66
3 15.31 -18.96 7.17 -5.23 10.59 7.61
4 2.34 2.34 2.82 2.82 6.09 6.09
Human capital
per worker
steady state -12.70 -12.70 4.73 4.73 37.03 37.03
1 -17.19 8.78 -1.77 7.64 6.79 9.17
2 -0.78 -0.27 2.03 1.79 3.91 3.82
3 20.19 -8.98 12.32 2.74 15.16 12.74
4 3.53 3.53 4.86 4.86 8.66 8.66
Income per
worker
steady state 5.28 5.28 23.22 23.22 58.64 58.64
1 -91.63 15.98 -19.22 9.41 4.97 9.42
2 -14.02 -0.46 3.03 2.17 4.08 3.91
3 419.65 -67.62 18.27 -11.94 15.81 11.29
4 16.96 16.96 6.85 6.85 8.99 8.99
Government
spending per
worker
steady state -50.73 -50.72 11.56 11.56 58.24 58.24
1 -4.83 7.58 4.71 6.98 8.00 9.00
2 -0.58 -0.23 1.74 1.65 3.79 3.76
3 15.14 1.50 10.59 8.33 14.73 13.72
4 2.76 2.76 4.25 4.25 8.45 8.45
Consumption of
young
steady state 14.58 14.59 27.55 27.55 58.91 58.91
1 -8.54 -8.54 -5.97 -5.97 -4.21 -4.21
2 -4.56 7.89 3.18 5.42 6.05 7.04
3 -9.73 -9.42 -6.52 -6.61 -2.85 -2.89
4 12.53 -0.81 6.86 4.68 10.42 9.44
Consumption of
old
steady state -8.61 -8.61 1.73 1.73 26.75 26.75
0 -2.74 -2.74 -1.90 -1.90 -1.32 -1.32
1 -6.54 10.22 5.60 8.81 9.99 11.34
2 -3.72 -3.25 -0.36 -0.46 2.88 2.83
3 19.59 0.91 13.03 9.81 18.33 16.95
4 3.32 3.32 5.10 5.10 10.42 10.42
Welfare
steady state 11.21 11.21 28.31 28.31 71.12 71.12
     
aAll numbers are percentage changes from the previous period.  Numbers for steady state indicate percentage change
between the initial and the final steady state.
Source:  computed by author.
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FIGURE 1
Source: World Population Projections (World Bank, 1994) and author’s calculations.
Note: Old-age dependency ratio is the proportion of population aged 65 and older to
population aged 15-64.
Old-Age Dependency Ratio in Developing and More 
Developed Regions
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
19
90
20
00
20
25
20
50
20
75
21
00
21
25
21
50
Years
de
pe
nd
en
cy
 ra
tio
developing
regions
more developed
regions
36
FIGURE 2
Tax Rate Transitions in A and B
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FIGURE 4
Capital Stock Transitions in A and B
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FIGURE 5
World Net Interest Rate Transitions
2.5
2.7
2.9
3.1
3.3
3.5
3.7
3.9
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
time periods
w orld net
interest rate
37
FIGURE 6
Balance of Payments Transitions for 
Country A
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FIGURE 8
Consumption Transitions of Old and Young 
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FIGURE 9
Welfare Transitions in A and B
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FIGURE 10
Welfare Transitions for Country A under 
Different Aging Scenarios
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FIGURE 11
Welfare Transitions for Country B under 
Different Aging Scenarios
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FIGURE 12
Capital Stock Transitions for Country A 
under Different Developing Country Aging 
Scenarios
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FIGURE 13
Capital Stock Transitions for Country B 
under Different Developing Country Aging 
Scenarios
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